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Applying Stalking Statutes To Groups - A
First Amendment Freedom Of Speech
Analysis
I. Introduction
On March 10, 1993, David Gunn, a doctor who performed abortions
in Florida, was shot in the back and killed by an anti-abortion protester
outside the clinic where he worked.' On March 31, 1993 in North
Carolina, Cathy Ann Rider, a leader of the South Carolina Missionaries
to the Unborn, was charged with stalking Lorraine Maquire, director
of the Charleston Women's Medical Clinic. 3 In 1993, Barbara Baldwin,
a Planned Parenthood leader, accused two members of an anti-abortion
group of stalking under Rhoad Island laws. Government authorities in
Minnesota recently applied their new stalking law against four pro-choice
activists' who followed members of an anti-abortion group.'
When most people think of stalking, they picture an individual in the
darkness of the night intimidating and following another individual,7 but
1. Phil Long and Martin Merzer, Doctor Slain at Anti-Abortion Rally in Pensacola First at
Clinic Protest, MIAMI HERALD, March 11, 1993, at IA.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1993). North Carolina defines a criminal stalker as one
who "willfully on more than one occasion follow[s] or is in the presence of another person
without legal purpose." Id.
3. Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike At Doctors' Home Lives; Illegal Intimidation
Or Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, April 8, 1993, at At. Rider made strong references to the
murder of Doctor Gunn by telling Maguire that she "might be next." Id. Rider also told Maguire
that she should get a bulletproof vest and that she would need federal marshalls, not just a clinic's
security guard, to protect her. Id. Maguire's continuous complaints to the Charleston police
department that Rider harassed, threatened and stalked her precipitated Rider's arrest. Id.
4. Judith Gaines, RI. Abortion Rights Leader Challenges Alleged Stalking by Foes, BOSTON
GLOBE, April 24, 1993, at Metro 20. Baldwin invoked Rhode Island's stalking law against
defendants, Barry Kilbane and Matthew Blanchette, who belonged to such groups as Operation
Rescue, the Lambs of Christ, and Missionaries to the Pre-bom, and continously harassed Baldwin.
Id. According to Baldwin, the defendants followed her from the Planned Parenthood office to a
nearby restaurant, and once inside "began yelling that I murdered babies." Id. A few days after
the incident intruders vandalized the clinic. Id. When Baldwin arrived to survey the damage, the
defendants confronted her and stated that they intended to follow her again. When Baldwin left
the clinic, the defendants followed her car but she managed to elude them. Id. Three days later
a Superior Court Judge granted her a temporary restraining order against the two men. Gaines,
supra.
5. A pro-choice activist denotes a person who supports a woman's right to have an abortion.
6. Doug Grow, Abortion Rights Activists Prove Worthy of Their Own Criticism, STAR
TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 1993, at 3B. Pro-choice members claimed that they tracked the anti-abortion
group so that the targeted doctors would not become objects of harassment and intimidation. Id.
7. See, e.g., Ted Anthony, Mother's Loss was Victory for Other Stalking Victims:
Daughter's Murder Led to New Law, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 19, 1993, at 4B. Stalking laws
support the belief that stalking usually involves only two individuals, the stalker and the victim.
Unfortunately, it usually requires the murder of a woman for the legislature to enact these laws.
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groups can also be guilty of stalking.' However, this does not
necessarily mean all group members will be charged with stalking. Only
those individual group members whose actions fall within the definition
of stalking will be held accountable. Of course, the group member or
members charged with stalking may claim any rights guaranteed to the
group by the Constitution. 9
The application of a stalking law to an individual stalker has faced
constitutional challenges over the last few years.' These challenges,
among others, will persist in the application of stalking law to groups.
As a result, group members charged with stalking contest the
statutes'constitutionality claiming the laws violate their First Amendment
right to free speech." Conversely, the stalker's victim contends that
their right to be left alone is infringed by the group's activity. 2 In light
of this conflict, this Comment discusses whether a group's First
Amendment right to free speech outweighs an individual's right to be left
alone. In order to accomplish this, the Comment focuses on both the
content-neutral 3 and content-based 4 freedom of speech analyses.
This Comment argues that the stalking statutes do not violate a
group's freedom of speech. Section II provides the history of stalking
For example, Pennsylvania created its new stalking law after the death of Laurie Show. Laurie
was killed by two girls when one of them thought that Laurie was trying to steal her boyfriend.
Months before the killing, one of the girls repeatedly called the Shows' residence and threatened
Laurie and her mother. She also harassed Laurie at work, yelled obscenities, and warned Laurie
to stay away from her boyfriend. Finally, on December 20, 1991, the two girls tricked Laurie's
mother into leaving her home, went into Laurie's bedroom and slit Laurie's throat. Through Mrs.
Show's efforts, state Rep. Michael McGeehan sponsored and helped pass a stalking statute.
8. See supra notes 3, 4, 6 and accompanying text.
9. Any group or individual member charged with stalking may claim a First Amendment
right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly or freedom of association.
10. The stalking laws generally face two constitutional challenges: vagueness and
overbreadth problems. For a complete discussion of these issues see Matthew J. Gilligan, Note,
Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to Thwart Those nho Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L.
REv. 285, 304-20 (1992).
11. U.S. Const. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech."
Id.
12. Justice Brandeis once stated that "the right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
13. The term content-neutral describes a statute or ordinance that does not regulate speech
based on hostility or favoritism towards the underlying message. See generally United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1968) (the ordinance prohibited the knowing destruction of
certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and as such there was nothing expressive
about the conduct).
14. The term content-based describes a statute or ordinance that accords preferential
treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject, thus distiguishing the conduct
based on the content of the demonstrator's speech. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61
(1980) (ordinance regulating residential picketing that had an exemption for labor picketing
discriminated certain conduct based upon the content of the communication).
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laws and the reasons for their creation. Section III examines the nature
of various state stalking statutes. Section IV provides a brief overview
and history of the First Amendment right to free speech. Sections V and
VI examine the constitutionality of stalking statutes under both the
content-neutral and content-based First Amendment freedom of speech
analyses. Finally, Section VII concludes that the stalking statutes do not
violate a group's First Amendment right to free speech because the statute
would pass either a content-neutral or content-based test.
II. The Evolution of Stalking Laws
In 1990, California enacted the first stalking statute 15 in the
United States in response to the unrelated murders of six young
women. 6 Robert Bards, an obsessed fan, murdered Rebecca Schaeffer,
a young actress and a co-star of the television show My Sister Sam. 7
Schaeffer's stalker repeatedly sent her threatening letters and followed her
on several occasions" prior to shooting her on the doorstep of her home
on July 18, 1989.' 9  The other five murders occurred soon after
Schaeffer's death, and they were all committed by the intimate partners
of the victims.2" Like Schaeffer, these five women were also stalked
before they were killed.2  This section discusses two issues: The
motivating forces behind states ratifying stalking statutes,22 and the
failure of traditional civil and criminal remedies to address the often
violent behavior that has become analogous with the act of stalking.23
A. The Motivating Forces Behind the Enactment of Stalking Statutes
Forty-six other states have followed California's lead since 1990 by
enacting their own stalking laws.24 The impetus behind these laws have
been events similar to those that occurred in California in which attackers
15. Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995).
16. See, e.g., Andrea Ford, Suspect On Tape Tells Of Actress's Last Words, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1991, at 133; James Quinn, Man Pleads No Contest In 'Stalking' Case, L.A. TIMES, July
23, 1991, at B3; Ted Appel, Bill Would Sharpen California's Stalking Law, UPI, Mar. 8, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
17. Ford, supra note 16, at B3.
18. Obsessed Fan Gets Life In Actress's Death, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at ]35; see also
Ford, supra note 16, at B3.
19. Ford, supra note 16, at B3.
20. Quinn, supra note 16, at B3.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
24. Forty-seven states have passed stalking or harassment laws. The exceptions are Arizona,
Missouri, and Wisconsin.
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harassed and killed their victims.25 Because, stalking has only recently
been recognized as a crime, there are very few statistics on the subject.26
The current data suggests that about five percent of women in the general
public will be stalked." Although women do stalk men,28 most of the
individuals who are stalked are women,29 and the stalker is usually a
husband, an ex-boyfriend 0 or other acquaintance. 3' Further, while
celebrities are frequently stalked by obsessed fans,32 most victims are
ordinary people stalked by individuals,33 with an increasing number of
individuals claiming to be stalked by members of a group.34
Researchers estimate that at least 200,000 people in the United States will
stalk someone this year.35  As these statistics show, stalking presents a
very serious problem. As the following discussion indicates, pre-existing
25. The murder of Tiffiney Graham the passage of New York's stalking law. See Claire
Serant, Stalked, ESSENCE, Oct. 1993, at 72. Tiffiney had a relationship with Thaddeus Davis
that ended when he became jealous and possessive. Id. Thaddeus then retaliated by threatening
and harassing Tiffiney. Id. Tiffiney became frightened and instructed her family and co-workers
to tell Thaddeus she was not in when he called, and she armed herself with mace. Id. Tiffiney's
precautions were in vain; Thaddeus shot her and then shot a subway conductor who tried to help
Tiffiney. See also Melinda Beck, Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 60
(suggesting that the murder of at least one woman constitutes the primary catalyst to the
enactment of stalking statutes.)
26. See Beck, supra note 25, at 60 (discussing the lack of comprehensive data on stalking).
27. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling The Terror Of Stalking, USA TODAY, July 21,
1992, at 9A.
28. See Letterman Fan Back In Prison, UPI, May 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File. The article concerns late night talk show host David Letterman and his ordeal
of being stalked by obsessed fan Margaret Ray. Id. Ray has been stalking Letterman for more
than four years and has been arrested for being inside his house on several occasions. Id.
29. Serant, supra note 25, at 72.
30. Serant, supra note 25, at 72. The article cites the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Uniform Crime Report which shows that nearly 30 percent of female homicide victims arekilled
by a husband or boyfriend. Id. Victim's rights advocates agree that many of these murdered
women were stalked, prior to their killing. Id.
31. See Puente, supra note 27, at 9A (legislators discussing stalking activity in their states);
Anthony, supra note 7, at 4B (two girls stalked Laurie Show); Gaines, supra note 4, at Metro 20
(anti-abortion group members known by doctor charged with stalking).
32. Doris Bacon, Vicious Crime, Double Jeopardy, PEOPLE, June 5, 1989, at 44 (Arthur
Jackson stalking television star Theresa Saldana); Josh Meyer, Man Held in Stalking of Pop
Singer Janet Jackson, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1992, at B3; Bruce Rubenstein, Stalker a Danger to
Himself and Others, ILLINOIS LEGAL TIMEs, June 1992, at 18 (describing threats of stalker Ralph
Nau against pop stars Cher, Olivia Newton-John, and Sheena Easton).
33. See 139 CONG. REc. S12901 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993) (statement of Senator Cohen);
Anthony, supra note 7, at 4B.
34. Boodman, supra note 3, at Al (director of Charleston Women's Medical Clinic stalked
by anti-abortion member); Gains, supra note 4, at Metro 20 (Planned Parenthood leader stalked
by two anti-abortion members); Long, supra note i, at IA (doctor shot and killed outside
abortion clinic by anti-abortion group protester).
35. Stalking Victims Turn to Congress for Help (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 29, 1992)
(discussing the psychiatric study which estimates that 200,000 stalkers exist in United States).
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laws and remedies failed to adequately address stalking behavior and
forced the enactment of stalking laws.
B. Civil and Criminal Remedies Available to Victims
Although stalking is a growing problem, critics attack the enactment
of the stalking laws.36 One of the criticisms is that there are civil
remedies and criminal laws that could be utilized to put an end to an
individual's stalking behavior." However, these critics fail to recognize
that existing remedies and laws have grossly failed the victims of stalking
time and time again."8
1. Civil Remedies
Some civil relief may be available to the victims of stalking. For
example, the victim may obtain a restraining order or sue for damages
under a claim of assault, trespass, invasion of privacy, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.39 Of course, a victim choosing to
pursue civil remedies, may be faced with expense, time, and enforcement
difficulties.4"
Civil relief can be expensive, and victims may not have the financial
resources required to try a successful case.4' Nevertheless, even if the
victim wins and is awarded damages, there is no guarantee the stalker
will cease his behavior or pay the damages.42 Additionally, it can take
36. See, e.g., Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992). The
panel discussed how present remedies and laws appropriately or inappropriately address stalking
behavior. Id. The panel accused legislators of using the public's fear of stalking to get votes.
Id. They claimed that instead of forcing law enforcement officials to use present laws, the
legislators simply claimed that they "got rid of stalking overnight" for reelection purposes. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Lisa Brennan, Prosecutor Grateful For Stalking Legislation, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, June 25, 1993, at 1. A victim, Barbara Jo Cohan, a victim of stalking, explained
that for the past 20 years, the old laws continually failed to protect her. -However, she expressed
hope that Pennsylvania's new stalking law may finally give her the relief she deserves. Id.
39. See Gilligan, supra note 10, at 288-99 for a more detailed explanation of the causes of
actions and remedies for harassment and stalking.
40. See Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part; When a Women Kills an Abusive Partner, Is
It an Act of Revenge or of Self Defense? A Growing Clemency Movement Argues for a New
Standard, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38 (discussing how many women attempt to file assault charges
and obtain restraining orders against their husbands, only to find that they provide little
protection).
41. Note, A Remedial Approach To Harassment, 70 VA. L. REV. 507 (1984) [hereinafter
Harassment] (discussing some of the difficulties victims of harassment face in obtaining relief).
42. Linda Gunderson, Note, Criminal Penalties For Harassment, 9 PAC. L.J. 217, 224
(1978).
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a considerable amount of time to obtain relief.43 This delay may allow
the perpetrator to continue stalking the victim, and consequently, the
victim remains in the same dangerous and unsure position as before the
filing of the suit." Furthermore, restraining orders rarely succeed in
protecting a victim, especially if the stalker merely choses to ignore the
order.45 In addition, the courts are unable to protect the victim at all
times, and the stalker faces very little deterrence from violating the
order.46
2. Criminal Relief
Harassment laws may provide stalking victims with criminal relief,
but often times, these laws prove to be ineffective."' In most states,
harassment laws are only used in situations where the harassment is done
by mail, telephone or other electronic device."' A harassment statute
fails to prohibit a victim from being followed.49 Furthermore, in those
states where harassment laws would extend to the typical activity of the
stalker, punishment produces minimal deterrence for a stalker."
Although harassment laws may address demeanor similar to that
43. Janice L. Grau, Note, Restraining Order Legislation For Battered Women: A
Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 703, 712 (1982).
44. See Terrorized By Stalkers (CNN television broadcast, Mar. I1, 1992)(describing an
incident in which a stalking victim was attacked and stabbed outside a courtroom while awaiting
word on the renewal of a restraining order against her ex-boyfriend).
45. See, e.g., David Holmstrom, Efforts To Protect Women From 'Stalkers' Gain Momentum
At State, Federal Levels, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 22, 1992, at I (stating that over
one-third of the restraining orders issued in Massachusetts between September and December
1991 were violated within the first few days of issuance).
46. Harassment, supra note 41, at 521 (discussing lenient sentences).
47. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 38, at I (Cohen repeatedly found herself in court charging
Evans with harassment); Boodman, supra note 3, at Al (Lorraine Maguire attempted to obtain
relief under the state's harassment law many times before resorting to the state's stalking statute).
48. Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal
Statue Forbidding Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass, 95 A.L.R.3D 411 (1979).
49. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-285 (West 1986). Louisiana's harassment law
states:
"No person shall: ] engage in or institute a telephone call, telephone conversation,
or telephone conference, with another person, anonymously or otherwise, and
therein use obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language, or make
any suggestion or proposal of an obscene nature or threaten any illegal or immoral
act with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass another person."
Id.




addressed by stalking statutes, stalking statutes are specifically defined to
address the fear and intimidation caused by the stalking behavior.5
Therefore, despite the availability of both civil and criminal relief,
these channels do not provide appropriate protection in many
circumstances. These gaps in the existing laws inspired states to enact
stalking statutes.52 As the next section demonstrates, these new laws are
designed to remedy the inadequacies of the existing laws by specifically
addressing the behavior that constitutes stalking.
III. Content and Application of State Stalking Laws
While each state enacted its own individual stalking statute, most of
the laws have some general similarities. 3 For instance, almost all of the
stalking statutes require the stalker to either "willfully, maliciously and
repeatedly follow[] or harass[] another person, 54 or "willfully and
repeatedly follow[] or lie[] in wait for such other person."55
Additionally, the laws require the stalker either to "make[] a credible
threat with the intent to place [the victim] in reasonable fear of death or
great bodily injury"5 6 or to "engage[] in conduct with the intent to cause
emotional distress to another person."5 7 Similarly, most states define
harassment as "a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
51. A state may expand its harassment laws to cover stalking activity instead of enacting a
separate stalking statute. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1989 and Supp. 1995).
However, a state may simply add a stalking statute onto an already existing harassment law. See,
e.g., 1993 Pa. Laws 28.
52. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1061
(Supp. 1994); 1993 Pa. Laws 28; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-1 (Supp. 1994).
53. See, e.g., Robert A. Guy, Jr., The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46
VAND. L. REV. 991,.1000-09.(1993). . . .
54. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90
(1994)(punishing a person who "makes a credible threat, either expressed or implied, with the
intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm is guilty of the
crime of stalking"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1994)(follow or harass); IDAHO
CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1994) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1994).
55. See, e.g., CqNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181d (1992) (follows or lies in wait); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-90 (Supp. 1994) (following or surveillance); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp.
1992) (addressing pursuing or surveillance); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 (Smith-Hurd
1993 & Supp. 1994) (follows the person or places under surveillance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
277.3 (1993) (follows or is in the presence of another without legal purpose).
56. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para.
5/12-7.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE § 708.11 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 508.140 (Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 121B (Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1992 & Supp. 1994).
57. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ch. 784.048 (Supp.
1995); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.41 lh (1992); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-311.02 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:12-10 (West Supp. 1994); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 1061 (Supp. 1994).
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specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or terrorizes the
person, and which serves no legitimate purpose.""8 "Course of conduct"
is generally defined as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose."59
Therefore, depending on how the particular statute defines stalking
will have a proportionate effect on what activity is covered. On the one
hand, if a statute designates "following or harassing" as stalking, then
prohibited behavior will include following an abortion clinic worker to
and from work and making repeated phone calls and threatening that
clinic worker.60 On the other hand, if the statute limits stalking to
merely actions of "repeatedly following or lying in wait," then probibited
behavior only includes following another individual but will not include
the mere threatening or harassing of an individual.6 Moreover, a
stalking statute that requires a person to place another in "reasonable fear
of death or great bodily injury" applies to a more narrow field of
behavior than a statute that only requires a victim to experience emotional
distress.62 For example, skinheads who stalk and cause a Jewish man
fear or concern may face charges under the latter stalking law but not the
former.63
Varying the definition of stalking affects the statute's utilization.
However, no matter how the statutes are defined, they are applicable to
group activities.64 States recognized this applicability, and attempted to
avoid constitutional challenges by refining the usage of the statutes.65
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9
(West Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-
4 (Supp. 1994).
59. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A
(Supp. 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1061
(Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1993).
60. See supra note 54 for statutes that address this behavior.
61. See supra note 55 for statutes that address this behavior.
62. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays, If That Man is Following Her, Connecticut Plans to
Follow Him, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 1992, at BI. Erin Tavegia experienced stalking when she was
just fifteen. Id. Although he never threatened her, the stalker would follow her to school, ask her
to get in his car, and suggest meetings after school. A statute requiring reasonable fear of death
or great bodily harm would not encompass this type of behavior. Id. Protection would only be
offered to Taregia by statute requiring infliction of emotional distress.
63. See also United States v. Lee, No. 90-5264, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25881 (D. Minn.
Oct. 7, 1993). Although this is not a stalking case, it does discuss whether the cross the
defendant set on fire caused African-American members of an apartment complex fear of death or
great bodily harm or emotional distress.
64. Boodman, supra note 3, at Al; Gaines, supra note 4, at Metro 20; Grow, supra note 6,
at 3B.
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1994) (behavior that serves a
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For instance, some states declared that harassment does not pertain to
"legitimate purposes"66 and that course of conduct does not include
"constitutionally protected activity., 67  States which limit their
definitions allow potential stalking behavior such as police or private
investigating activities because the activities serve a legitimate purpose.
Therefore, whether the stalking laws can be applied to a group hinges on
the question of whether the actions of a group are protected under a
constitutional provision, like the First Amendment freedom of speech
clause, or whether the actions serve a legitimate purpose. 68  The next
section discusses the possibility that a stalking statute, by regulating
speech, infringes on First Amendment rights. The analysis of a stalking
statute will depend on whether it is determined to be content-neutral6 9
or content-based legislation.70
IV. Determining When Speech Can Be Regulated---A Brief
History of The First Amendment Right To Free Speech
"Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech.'
The purpose of the First Amendment was to insure the free flow of ideas
and to deny the Government the opportunity to censor any speech.72
Over the years the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed these
principles by vigorously striking down regulations on speech.73
legitimate purpose or is a constitutionally protected activity is exempt); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
1173 (Supp. 1995) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (1993) (same).
66. While none of the stalking statutes define "legitimate purpose," Black's Law Dictionary
defines "legitimate" as "[tihat which is lawful, legal, recognized by law, or according to law; as,
legitimate children, legitimate authority, lawful power, legitimate sport or amusement." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 901 (6th ed. 1990).
67. While none of the stalking statutes define "constitutionally protected activity," Black's
Law Dioctionary defines "constitutional liberty" or "freedom" as "[sluch freedom as is enjoyed
by the citizens of a country or state under the protection of its constitution. The aggregate of
those personal, civil, and political rights of the individual which are guaranteed by the
constitution and secured against invasion by the government or any of its agencies." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 311-12 (6th ed. 1990). See supra note 65.
68. See supra note 65 for examples of statutes that have limited their definition of stalking.
69. See supra note 13.
70. See supra note 14.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment applies to the states via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
72. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
73. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, _ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding that
"unprotected" classes of speech cannot be used to favor a particular view); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the government from prohibiting an
expression of an idea, especially those that society finds offensive or disagreeable.); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1980) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited residential
picketing but exempted labor picketing was unconstitutional).
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However, this reaffirmation has not been absolute, and the Supreme
Court has recognized some exceptions to these general principles.74
Specifically, the Court has recognized that an ordinance or regulation that
is content-neutral will be upheld as long as it meets certain standards.75
Similarly, if it is determined that the regulation is content-based, the court
may still find it constitutional if it qualifies as a recognized exception.76
The four exceptions recognized by the Court for content-based regulations
are incitement to riot (or the clear and present danger test),"
obscenity,78 libel79 and fighting words.80 A regulation on speech that
does not fit into one of these exceptions will be strictly scrutinized and
will probably fail.8  Accordingly, the following sections first consider
the Stalking statute within a content-neutral analysis and then apply a
stalking statute within a content-based analysis.
V. Viewing the Stalking Statute as Content-Neutral for Purposes of a
First Amendment Analysis
When a court reviews a statute that regulates speech or expression,
the first determination the court must make is whether the statute is
content-neutral or content-based.8 2 If the court concludes that the statute
is content-neutral then the statutes must comply with four elements to be
considered constitutional. 3
The first element in the content-neutral analysis determines the
"place" or the nature of the forum the speaker seeks to employ.84
Specifically, the court determines if the forum in which the speech takes
74. See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-3
(1984)(the Supreme Court refuses to declare the constitutionality of a law that simply restricts
speech).
75. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a regulation on residential picketing);
Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (upholding a regulation on picketing). See
also infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
77. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
78. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
79. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 255.
80. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
81. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (courts impose stricter standards of
review on regulations that prohibit expression than on regulations that suppress
noncommunicative conduct).
82. Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
83. Id. at 43-46. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171 (1983).
84. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481-82. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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place is a traditional public forum, a public forum created by government
designation or a non-public forum. 5 The other three elements are: that
the statute furthers a substantial or significant state interest," that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve the significant interest, 7 and that
it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. 8 The
court will uphold the regulation if all four elements are satisfied.
The Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz demonstrated how to
conduct this content-neutral analysis.89 In Frisby, the Court had to
determine the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting picketing
"before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual."90 The
appellees, pro-life activists, were arrested pursuant to an ordinance when
they attempted to express their views on a public street outside the
residence of an abortion doctor.9' The Court found that the primary
purpose of the ordinance was to protect and preserve the home.92 The
town enacted the ordinance because it determined that residential
picketing caused emotional distress and had "as its object the harassing
of the occupants."93  The Court, using a content-neutral analysis,
concluded that the ordinance was constitutional because it met the four
elements of a content-neutral analysis.94 The Frisby decision presents
the typical content-neutral analysis used by courts.95 The issues raised
in Frisby closely parallel those that a stalking statute will face on a
constitutional challenge because both concern a regulation of speech and
conduct."
A. The Determination of Content-Neutrality
The Court in Frisby classified the statute as content-neutral because
it prohibited all picketing before or about a residence.97  The Court
85. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479-80. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
86. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
90. Id. at 477.
91. Id. at 476.
92. Id. at 477.
93. Id.
94. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488.
95. See also United States Postal Service v. Counsel of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n., 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36
(1980); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
96. The Frisby ordinance regulated picketing, which is a combination of speech and
conduct. The stalking statutes will regulate the group's conduct which will incidentally restrict a
group's freedom of expression.
97. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.
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arrived at this decision because the statute did not distinguish between
prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of content.9"
Stalking statutes should also be declared to be content-neutral
because they prohibit only those actions defined in the statute, and as
such, the intent would only be to control the actions of the group and not
the group's speech or expression.99 Even though an individual's or
group's speech may incidentally be restricted, the primary purpose of a
stalking statute is to control the harassing actions of the individual or
group. Consequently, no matter what type of speech a group engages in,
if they are in violation of the statute, their actions can be prohibited. 0
"Neutral" is defined as not being aligned "with a political or ideological
grouping... indifferent... impartial."'' Hence, because stalking statutes
are indifferent or impartial as to their application to any group's
"speech," they are content-neutral. 0 2
B. Determining the Public Forum
After classifying the ordinance as content-neutral, the Frisby Court
had to determine whether the forum where the picketing took place
constituted a traditional public forum, 0 3 a public forum created by
government designation, or a non-public forum. 4 The type of forum
directly affects which test a court utilizes to determine a regulation's
constitutionality. 5 The most stringent standard is applied to statutes
that attempt to regulate speech in traditionally public places. 6 This is
true because public places "have immemorially been held in trust for the
98. Id. at 481-82.
99. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1995); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp.
1994); 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10.
100. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181d (1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1989 &
Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.41 Ih
(1992).
101. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 795 (9th ed. 1986).
102. See supra notes 97-101.
103. This Comment limits the discussion to activities that occur in a traditional public
forum, where most stalking activities occur. The standard applied to an analysis of this forum is
stricter than that applied to a public forum created by government designation or a non-public
form.
104. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479-80. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
105. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The Supreme Court created three tests to determine the
constitutionality of content-neutral regulations for the three forums: (1) traditional public forum--
the regulation must serve a significant government interest and allow alternative channels of
communication; (2) public forum created by government designation--the regulation must
effectuate a compelling state interest; (3) non-public forum--the regulation must be reasonable so
as not to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. Id.
106. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481.
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use of the public and, ..., have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."' 7
The Frisby Court classified the forum as a traditional public forum
because the anti-abortion group wanted to picket on public streets and
sidewalks in front of the doctor's residence.'0 8 The Court emphasized
that public streets and sidewalks constitute the "archetype" of the
traditional public forum because they have historically been used for
public assembly and debate."0 9 After determining that the ordinance
was a regulation of a traditional public forum, the Frisby Court applied
the most stringent standard to determine if the ordinance served a
significant state interest, was narrowly tailored to serve that purpose, and
left open ample alternative channels of communication."0 The Court
found all of these elements present, and endorsed the ordinance's
constitutionality. "'
Consequently, any activity that constitutes speech and occurs on
public streets, sidewalks or other public areas is considered to be in a
traditional public forum." 2  Therefore, the stalking statutes will be
declared to be within the traditional public forum because actions that
violate these laws are usually performed on public streets, sidewalks,
parks, roads, or schools." 3 Accordingly, stalking laws, like the Frisby
ordinance, will be strictly scrutinized to determine if they serve a
significant state interest, are narrowly tailored to serve that purpose and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
C. The State Must Have A Significant Interest To Protect.
In Frisby, the Court found that the state interest which was
addressed by the ordinance was the protection of residential property, and
concluded that this is a significant governmental interest." 4 A state's
concern in protecting the privacy and tranquility of the home is of the
highest priority.' Although stalking statutes are intended to safeguard
107. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
108. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 480-82.
Ill. Id. at 488
112. Id. at 480.
113. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 7, at 4B (stalked at home); Boodman, supra note 3, at
Al (stalked at work); Puente, supra note 27, at 9A (stalked at work and home); Maura Reynolds,
City Schools Crack Down On Weapons, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, April 28, 1993, at B-I
(stalking at public schools).
114. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
115. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
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a person's privacy and well-being in the home, they are also intended to
protect the privacy and well-being of the person in public." 6
Therefore, the reasons for upholding the ordinance in Frisby give
important insight into what behavior the court considers to be a
significant state interest." 7
By examining the stalking laws themselves, the courts must
determine whether the states have a significant interest which is in need
of protection."' In most states, the creation of a stalking statute is
preceded by a horrifying story of murder."9 As a result, the statutes
were created to deal with the ever increasing problem of violence that
plagues not only celebrities but more often ordinary citizens. 20 The
Supreme Court has found that residential privacy is a significant
government interest because it serves to protect the unwilling listener. 2'
The Frisby Court stated "although in many locations, we expect
individuals to simply avoid speech they do not want to hear. . ., the home
is different."' 22 The reason for this difference is that those within the
home are deprived of the option of avoiding the unwanted speech.'23
The victims of stalking are forced to deal with a similar predicament
because the stalker will not allow them to simply avoid the speech they
do not want to hear. Stalking statutes are designed to address the very
behavior the Frisby Court expected people to be able to avoid.'24
States have acknowledged that there are occasions when an individual
simply cannot avoid the unwanted speech because they are continuously
plagued by a stalker's "speech."'2 5 Accordingly, these stalking laws
protect unwilling listeners who are powerless to avoid the speech the
116. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (1986).
117. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482-88.
118. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.411 h (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-I (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-315 (Supp. 1994).
119. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 25, at 60; Anthony, supra note 7, at 4B.
120. See, e.g., supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. Studies have shown that most
women who are killed by their husbands or ex-boyfriends (I)were stalked by those men before
the crime took place and (2)had called the police on more than one occasion. See Gibbs, supra
note 40, at 38. Further, a steady increase of violence at abortion clinics has arisen over the last
few years. This violence has focused on clinic workers and would constitute stalking under most
state's statutes. See Long, supra note 1, at IA; Boodman, supra note 3, at Al; Gaines, supra
note 4, at Metro 20.
121. Roivan, 397 U.S. at 737.
122. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
123. Id. at 484-85.
124. See supra notes 53-63 (discussing the behavior stalking statutes prohibit).
125. Id.
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group inflicts on them. 26  Consequently, the state finds itself in a
situation where it has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from
unwanted and potentially dangerous speech.'
These statutes also protect the victim from violence that usually
arises as a climax of stalking behavior. t2s As Senator Cohen stated
"[s]talking is also unique because it is often a series of acts that escalate
into violence."' 29 While it is true that the Frisby decision focused on
the home, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the state has a
significant interest in protecting unwilling listeners of speech when that
speech would also constitute harassment. As a result, when stalking
statutes are used against groups, they serve two purposes. The first
purpose is to protect the unwilling listener who cannot avoid the
speech. 30 The second is to protect the victim from the violence that
is more often than not the end result of such behavior.'' Under these
circumstances, the state has a significant interest in protecting its citizens
from these types of behavior.
D. The Law Must Be Narrowly Tailored To Serve The Significant
State Interest
The next consideration in a traditional public forum test is whether
the law is narrowly tailored to serve the state interest.' 32 A statute is
considered narrowly tailored if it eliminates no more than the precise
source of the "evil" it seeks to remedy. 133 Thus, a statute can call for
a complete ban on speech only if every action it prohibits makes up the
targeted "evil.' 34  In Frisby the ordinance was narrowly tailored
because it only prohibited picketing focused on a particular
residence.'35  The Court would not allow a general ban on all
residential picketing because such a ban would not be narrowly tailored
126. Id.
127. See 139 CONG. REC. S12901 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen)
(stalkers call their victims at all times of the day or night, harass their victims by calling 20 to 30
times a day, follow their victims from home to work, to the store, to school, and even when they
go out on dates).
128. Id.
129. Id. at S12902
130. Id. at S12901
131. Id.
132. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
133. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984).
134. See id. (upholding a ban on all signs on public property because: (I) the state had a
significant interest in avoiding visual clutter and blight, and (2) the ordinance was narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest uniformly by banning the "evil", all signs).
135. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.
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to serve the state interest of protecting the private residence and the
unwilling listener.'36 Additionally, a general ban would have prohibited
the flow of information to the public.'37 Such an ordinance would not
merely eliminate the targeted evil of residential privacy, but would
deprive the whole community of the group's message.'38 The Frisby
ordinance banned picketing that intruded into privacy but did not ban
picketing that was intended to give information to the general public. 39
The stalking statutes seek to obtain the same goal by prohibiting
only the "speech" which is no longer intended to distribute a message to
the general public. 40 When the group's intent is to cause an individual
fear and intimidation, the stalking statutes will prohibit the "speech.''
For example, Randall A. Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue 4 2 and
the nation's best known anti-abortion leader, stated that his organization
would "do everything we can to torment these people [doctors and staff
of abortion clinics]" and would "expose them, ... humiliate them, ...
disgrace them, which is our right. 1 43  This reasoning is equally
applicable to the Ku Klux Klan, or any other hate group, who target a
specific individual, family, or homestead instead of distributing their
message to the general public. 44 It must be concluded that if a group's
actions can be classified as "harassing or following" and the actions cause
emotional harm or fear of bodily injury," then the "speech" is not
intended to convey a message to the public. On the contrary, the intent
must be to cause intimidation or harassment and such behavior cannot be
protected.
136. Id. at 485-87.
137. Id. at 486.
138. Id. at 486-88.
139. Id. at 486.
140. 39 CONG. REC. S12901 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (the
government cannot tolerate a situation where someone is allowed to place another individual or
family in fear of physical or emotional harm).
141. Id.
142. Operation Rescue is one of the largest and most organized anti-abortion groups in the
United States.
143. See Boodman, supra note 3, at Al. Terry further stated that the goal of his
organization is to make targeted doctors "a liability to everyone they encounter." He has even
suggested that members follow a doctor's wife to a hair salon and picket outside with signs which
read "this hairdo is paid for by blood money." Id.
144. See United States v. Lee, 5 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) Lee was charged under a
conspiracy statute for setting a cross on fire with the intent to cause African-American families
fear and intimidation. Id. at 1298-99. Such behavior may also be found to violate stalking laws
in the future.
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Some groups may argue that their intent is not to cause fear or
intimidation, and they legitimately intend to educate the public.' 45 The
Frisby Court addressed this argument by stating that regardless of the
communicative intent of the group, the residential picketing still had the
same offensive effect. 46 The picketing caused "the home [to] become[]
something less than a home when and while the picketing ... continue[s]....
[The] tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they
are not, for that reason, less inimical to family privacy and truly domestic
tranquility.' ' 47 Stalking behavior of a group can have similar, if not
greater, psychological effect on an individual. Stalking poses the
additional threat that the group or the stalked victim may resort to
violence. 14  The victims of stalking live with the fear of knowing
members of a group may follow or harass them or their children at any
time. 14' This type of activity transcends violating the privacy and
tranquility of the home to include badgering the individual everywhere
she goes.
Under these circumstances, the stalking statutes must be deemed
narrowly tailored for the intended purpose. The only speech prohibited
is that which establishes the "evils" of stalking. All stalking statutes
require behavior that constitutes "following or harassing" and causes
emotional distress or a reasonable fear of bodily harm.'5  This
combination narrows the application of the statutes to a limited amount
of actions. The statutes do not interfere with a group's freedom of
expression because they are invoked only when the group's "speech"
includes intimidation and fear. 5' For example, if a group, like a labor
union or abortion group, is engaged in picketing a premises but is not
engaged in harassing behavior then the statutes are not applicable.
Furthermore, even if the group is engaging in harassing behavior, the
statutes may not apply unless the individual can prove that a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would also experience emotional harm or
fear of death or bodily injury.'5 2 These requirements narrowly tailor
145. See Boodman, supra note 3, at Al.
146. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
147. Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79'(1980)).
148. 139 CONG. REC. S12902 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (stalking is
"unique because it is often a series of acts that escalate into violence").
149. Id. at S12901.
150. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
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the statutes' application only to those actions that represent the "evils" of
stalking.
E. There Are Still Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
Open to the Groups
The final part of the traditional public forum test is that the statute
must leave open ample alternative channels of communication." 3 The
Frisby Court found that this element was very easily met because the
ordinance prohibited only picketing in front of a particular residence.'54
Therefore, the picketers in Frisby were free to conduct their activity
anywhere else, as long as the picketing was not focused on one
residence. 5'
Analogously, the stalking statutes only prohibit "speech" that can be
defined as stalking. 56 The statutes permit a number of alternatives for
the group to express their views. For example, a group can picket, pass
handbills, carry signs, or express their views in any other fashion as long
as they do not violate the statute. These statutes are not intended to
punish any group's thoughts, but instead punish actions that harass or
intimidate.' 57 Specifically, the state's interest is to address the harms
that are caused by stalking and not to suppress beliefs or views with
which it disagrees.' When the group's actions move from speech to
other types of activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact, they are no longer protected by the
constitution.' 59
VI. Viewing The Stalking Laws As Content-Based Through A
"Fighting Words" Doctrine Analysis
If the stalking statutes are viewed as being regulations based on
content, 60 then they would have to be considered "fighting word" statutes
153. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
154. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 150.
157. Id.
158. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, _ U.S. _ 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
159. Id.
160. There are a few situations in which the stalking statutes may be considered to be
content-based. For example, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, South Carolina, West
Virginia, Wyoming and Nevada all exclude labor picketing from coverage under their stalking
statutes. Even if a labor group's activities fall within the definition of stalking in these states, and
they place an individual legitimately in fear of death or bodily harm or emotional distress, their
actions cannot be prevented under the stalking statute. Therefore, the stalking statutes would be
considered based on content because the statutes would discriminate between conduct based upon
1088
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in order to be constitutional. 6 ' Fighting words are "those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace .... [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."'62 Simply, "fighting words" are those
words which could cause the hearer of the speech to resort to violence or
a breach of peace. Though the "fighting words" doctrine has come under
some criticisms over the years,'63 the United Supreme Court reaffirmed
its use in the case of KA. V v. City of St. Paul.'64
In this case, the petitioner, R.A.V., a member of the skinheads,
allegedly made and burned a cross on the lawn of an African-American
family. 65  He was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance. 166  The petitioner challenged the law on the grounds that it
was content-based and as such was facially invalid under the First
Amendment. 67 The Minnesota Supreme Court limited the scope of the
law to be applicable only to fighting words and held the law to be
valid. 68  The United States Supreme Court accepted Minnesota's
a group's communication. See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 455. In Carey the court was looking at a
residential picketing ordinance that prohibited all picketing but excluded picketing of a place of
employment involved in a labor dispute. The Court determined that the ordinance was based on
content because it discriminated between lawful and unlawful conduct based on the
demonstrator's communication.
Stalking statutes may be considered content-based because their application depends on the
likely communicative impact of the conduct. For example, whether a stalking statute can be
invoked against a pro-life group that is following a doctor to stores, restaurants, on dates, and to
and from work, will depend on the impact the group's expression has on the doctor. Thus, the
statutes rely on the impact of the speech on the individual. The law will force a court to look at
the content of the expression to determine if there has been a violation, and thus, changes the law
into a content-based regulation. See e.g., United States v. Lee, 5 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993)
(examining a conspiracy act which relied on the communicative impact of the speech and thus,
required the court to look at the content of the defendant's speech).
161. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized
four categories of permissible content based regulations. Those categories are incitement to riot
(or clear and present danger test), libel, obscenity and fighting words. This Comment only
examines the fighting words doctrine because it offers the stalking statutes the best chance for
survival of a constitutional challenge.
162. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
163. See generally Note, The Demise Of The Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An
Argument For Its Interment, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1129 (1993) (for an excellent discussion on the
history and criticisms of the "fighting words" doctrine).
164. _ U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
165. Id. at 2541.
166. St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code §292.02 (1990).
167. Id.
168. Id. In re welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn. 1991).
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determination that the law only applied to fighting words but still found
the statute unconstitutional. 69 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
found the ordinance to be facially unconstitutional because it proscribed
speech entirely on the basis of subject matter. 7 ' The opinion of the
divided Court would be applicable to a stalking statute that is declared to
be content-based and as such must be examined.
A. The Existence Of "Unprotected" Classes Of Speech
In R.A. V., the Court agreed that there are categories of speech that
are of little value to society and can be regulated. 71 Nevertheless, the
majority of the Court believed that even these "unprotected" classes of
speech are within the First Amendment's protection.'72 Accordingly,
an ordinance can be content-based and regulate an "unprotected" class of
speech, but within the class the regulation must be content-neutral.'73
Hence, the government can prohibit an "unprotected" class of speech such
as libel, but it cannot make a content-based law that only prohibits libel
critical of the government.1
74
Under this analysis, it must be determined whether the stalking
statutes can be categorized as "fighting words.' 75  Even if stalking
statutes constitute fighting word statutes and as such are within an
"unprotected" class of speech, the states may not use the statutes to
arbitrarily prohibit or promote any view. 76 The statutes must prohibit
all verbal and non-verbal expression that would be considered fighting
words. 1
77
If stalking statutes are determined to fall within a proscribable class
of speech, then they must regulate speech regardless of the content. The
R.A. V. ordinance failed to meet this requirement because it only
prohibited speech executed "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.' 7 18  Verbal or nonverbal expression, no matter how severe,
would escape punishment under this statute if it fell outside of this
limited definition. 79 For example, speech based on political affiliation,
169. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at2542.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2542-43.
172. Id. at 2543-44.
173. Id. at 2544-45.
174. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at2543.
175. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
176. R.A.V., 112S. Ct. at2545.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2547; St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code §292.02 (1990).
179. Id.
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union membership or sexual preference would not be covered because the
St. Paul ordinance was limited to speech based on race, color, creed,
religion or gender. 80
The stalking statutes would satisfy this requirement because they
would prohibit all "fighting words" and thus, would not be punishing or
favoring a particular view point.' On the other hand, statutes that
expressly exempt from prosecution any expression, such as labor
picketing, may be found to be unconstitutional because the statute could
be favoring a particular type of fighting words.'82 Specifically, in order
for a statute to be constitutional, it would have to regulate all expression
within the unprotected class regardless of the particular viewpoint
asserted. Stalking laws would regulate all verbal or nonverbal expression
regardless of the idea which the group is trying to protect.
83
Furthermore, the stalking statutes only ban the group's expression
because of the actions they entail and not because of the ideals
expressed. 184 For example, burning the American flag can be punished
by an outdoor fire ordinance since it would be regulating action, but this
same behavior could not be punished by an ordinance against dishonoring
the flag because this would be regulating an expression of an idea.'85
Consequently, a statute may not be able to prohibit the burning of a cross
or the right to picket by a law that punishes burning crosses or all
picketing, but they can prohibit these activities by a stalking law that
prohibits repeated harassing and following behavior that causes a person
to fear harm or emotional distress. The Supreme Court's requirements
for a valid statute, in an area of speech that can "be regulated because of
its constitutionally proscribable content," would be met because the
stalking statute would punish all classes of fighting words, and thus
would be content-neutral.' 86
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211
(Baldwin 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-1 (1994).
182. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(c) (Supp. 1994) (rebuttable presumption
that labor picketing is not stalking); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3(c) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1994) (exempting lawful picketing); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §200.575(b)(1) (Michine Supp.
1993) (exempting labor picketing).
183. See supra note 181.
184. Id.
185. RA.yV., 112 S. Ct. at2544.
186. Id. at 2543 (emphasis omitted).
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B. Exceptions To The Requirement Of Content Neutrality Within The
"Unprotected" Classes
The concurring opinion in R.A. V. stated that the majority's decision
would require the government to "proscribe all speech or no speech at
all."' 87 The majority disagreed with this assertion and stated that the
decision would only require an ordinance that regulated proscribable
expression to do so with a content neutral approach.' Hence, a statute
can only prohibit a certain area of expression as long as the prohibition
is not based on content. For example, a state could prohibit obscenity,
or other types of proscribable speech, only in certain media or markets,
"for although that prohibition would be 'underinclusive,' it would not
discriminate on the basis of content."'8 9  The R.A. V. majority
recognized that the content-neutral requirement is not absolute, and thus,
there are exceptions.' 9"
The exceptions to the content neutrality requirement occur in three
instances.' 9' First, regulations that only prohibit the worst kinds of
speech, like the most vulgar obscenity, do not have to maintain
neutrality.'92 Regulations of a subclass of proscribable speech
associated with certain "secondary effects" of the speech are also
exempt.' 93 Title VII sexual harassment in employment would serve as
an example because the regulation is concerned with the "secondary
effects" the speech has on women in the workplace and not the harasser's
expression.' 94 Finally, if there is no possibility that the government is
trying to suppress the expression of ideas, content neutrality will not be
required.' Most stalking statutes will not have to be concerned with
these exceptions because they meet the content-neutrality requirement.
However, other states like those that exempt labor, will be forced to
defend their statutes with the use of one of these exceptions. 96
187. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring)(emphasis omitted).
188. Id. at 2545.
189. Id.
190. RA. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545-47.
191. Id. at 2545-47.
192. Id. at 2546.
193. Id. at 2546.
194. Id. at 2546-47.
195. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at2547.
196. See supra note 182.
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C. Determining Whether Stalking Statutes Can Be Considered
"Fighting Words "---The Immediate Breach of Peace Requirement
One element of the fighting words doctrine, which was not discussed
in R.A.V., is whether the speech constitutes an expression of the kind that
"tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of peace."' 97 While there is
some question as to which standard would be used to measure the "tends
to incite" element,'98 there are many examples to show that stalking
activities may cause the hearer of the speech to resort to violence. For
instance, over the last few years the violence directed towards doctors and
staff of abortion clinics has increased.' 99 This increase in violence has
not only brought about a rise in fear and anxiety in these workers, but
has also brought about the desire to protect themselves, with doctors
hiring bodyguards and carrying guns.200 For instance, after hearing
about the death of Dr. David Gunn, Dr. Buck Williams, who had a
license to carry a firearm, upgraded his weapon from a .38 revolver to a
.45 semi-automatic.
20 1
Many other examples of the escalating violence can be found within
the area of domestic relations. There are many cases of women who
have broken off relationships and have found themselves being stalked or
even killed by their former husbands or boyfriends.20 2 Of course, there
are countless cases of women buying guns and killing their husband or
ex-boyfriend and going to jail for first degree murder.20 3
On the other hand, most victims of stalking are frightened and
terrorized. Accordingly, stalking statutes require the victim of stalking
to be fearful of death or bodily harm or to suffer emotional harm before
the statute is invoked. 2' This indicates that the legislators have created
the statutes to address the problem of stalking victims living in fear and
intimidation and not to address the problem of victims lashing out at
197. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
198. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment And The Informal Ghettoization
Of Women, 106 HARV. L. REv. 517, 560-562, (1993).
199. See Long, supra note 1, at IA; Boodman, supra note 3, at Al; Gaines, supra note 4, at
Metro 20.
200. See, e.g., Long, supra note 1, at IA; Richard Lacayo, One Doctor Down, How Many
More?, TIME, Mar. 22, 1993, at 46.
201. Id. at 46.
202. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Parole Advised For Woman nho Killed Abusive Partner,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1993, at A18 (discussing women who have killed their abusive husbands or
boyfriends and citing statistics on women who were killed by either their husbands or
boyfriends).
203. Id.
204. See supra note 181.
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stalkers. °5 This may make it difficult for a stalking law to be
classified as a fighting words statute because the doctrine requires the
hearer of the expression to become violent or cause a breach of
peace.2"6 The intent of the statute is not to address the behavior of the
victim but to end the intimidating and violent behavior of the stalker.
This intention may make it difficult for stalking statutes to be classified
as "fighting words."
VI. Conclusion
Group stalking, like individual stalking, is a serious problem that is
not going to disappear. Accordingly, because existing civil and criminal
relief has proved to be inadequate, these laws are needed to protect
victims from fear and intimidation.20 7 Of course, while providing this
protection, legislators must also protect the group member's right to
freedom of speech.
Under the content-neutral and content-based freedom of speech
analyses the stalking statutes have achieved this balance. Under a
content-neutral analysis, stalking laws should be considered a regulation
on the traditional public forum.208  Additionally, a state has a
significant interest in the protection of its citizens from the terrorizing and
often violent "speech" of the group members. The statutes have been
narrowly tailored to serve this interest, and the laws leave open
alternative channels of communication for the group to express itself."9
Considering the stalking statutes as a content-based regulation also
leads to the conclusion that the stalking laws are constitutional. The
statutes regulate one of the four recognized classes of "proscribable
speech." Furthermore, within this proscribable class of speech, the
statutes are not regulating any speech on the basis of subject matter
because they prohibit all "fighting words."2 ' Finally, it should be
concluded that stalking statutes address fighting words because stalking
may cause the victim to resort to violence or to cause a breach of
peace.
2"
Stalking laws have provided the appropriate balance between the
need and right to be left alone and the rights of freedom of expression
205. 139 CONG. REc. S12901 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993) (Statements of Sen. Cohen)
(discussing stalking in general and focusing on the fear and intimidation that stalking causes).
206. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
207. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 114-59 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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and speech. Therefore, the stalking statutes should be found to be
constitutional.
Thomas J. Nehilla

